January 14, 2009

The challenges confronting U.S. President-elect Barack Obama are enormous ― almost unprecedented in American history for a new U.S. leader.

He faces a worldwide economic crisis and a traumatized American economy; a bloody confrontation in Gaza that is extinguishing hopes for peace between Israel and its neighbors; extracting American forces from Iraq without leaving chaos behind; a war in Afghanistan that is not going well; an Iran on its way to becoming a nuclear weapons state; and disturbing signs that a new India-Pakistan conflict is not impossible.

Any one of these problems would be a serious burden for a new American president. Together, they constitute an array of challenges that will require Obama to carefully prioritize the personal energy, political capital, and diplomatic and military assets he plans to use on each of these issues. Failure to do so will risk having one fire burn out of control while attending to another.

However, the list of challenges is not complete. Lurking near the top of the new President's crises is North Korea's nuclear weapons program ― an issue that, if history is any guide, will inevitably compel the new President's personal attention early on.

A new U.S. President might hope to deal with this problem later and turn his attention to other, seemingly more immediate, concerns. But the danger that North Korea might engage in new acts of nuclear proliferation argues against doing so.

So does the possibility that Pyongyang might try to test the new U.S. administration. If President Obama is wise and prudent ― and he is nothing if not both ― he will make sure that his national security team pays priority attention to the North Korea issue from day one.

Unfortunately for the new American President, the cards he has been dealt on North Korea are not good.

Despite the halting progress made in the six-party talks over the past two years and the disablement of part of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons production facilities at Yongbyon, Obama inherits a worse situation vis-a-vis North Korea than President George W. Bush did in 2001.

The demise of the Geneva Agreed Framework in 2002 enabled the DPRK to resume the full-scale production of plutonium. Today, even with the freeze at Yongbyon, Pyongyang's stockpile of fissile material is many times what it was eight years ago ― enough plutonium for as many as 8-12 nuclear weapons, according to experts.

And although North Korea has committed itself to returning to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at some point, the DPRK today is outside the scope of any controls of its nuclear ambitions other than self-imposed ones.

Most importantly, North Korea's nuclear weapons test in October 2006 saw the DPRK cross a critical threshold. There is little precedent for a nation to give up a nuclear program once it has tested a weapon. The Obama administration has an overwhelming task in convincing North Korea to abandon its new nuclear status.

The Obama administration will also need to tackle issues its predecessor chose to put off. In order to focus on more achievable objectives, the Bush administration decided to deal with concerns over North Korea's uranium enrichment activities and its nuclear cooperation with Syria later.

The Bush administration also opted to put off until later phase negotiations the disposition of the DPRK's existing nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear testing facilities, drawing widespread, bipartisan criticism, seen by some as ignoring the very issue that had sparked the nuclear crisis of 2002 ― suspicions about the North's uranium-related activities.

It was also argued that the United States was insufficiently attentive to the main threats posed by the North's nuclear program ― proliferation activities and weapons development.

As the Obama administration develops its approach on the nuclear issue, concerns over such issues are likely to return. More bluntly stated, the bill for their deferral may arrive on Obama's watch.

How will the new American President tackle a North Korean challenge that is even more complex than the one his predecessor inherited?

The team of veterans President-elect Obama has assembled, including highly regarded Asia hands, will ensure that the new administration keeps precedent and history clearly in mind while formulating North Korea policy.

While it's unfortunate that the North Korea nuclear issue has been with us for a painfully long time, the good news is that this experience has taught us what works ― and what doesn't ― in dealing with Pyongyang.

The Bush administration took almost six years to fully absorb this lesson, by which time it was too late to undo the mistrust and enmity created by its earlier policy approach and complete a deal with Pyongyang.

Obama's national security team has certainly absorbed the lessons of the past eight years, including the advantages of pursuing bilateral and multilateral diplomatic tracks simultaneously and dealing with the North Korean regime as it is, not as one might wish it to be.

As a result, pragmatism and a hard-nosed, practical approach to negotiations will characterize the new administration's policy toward Pyongyang. So will avoiding the internal ideological rifts in Washington that sapped the strength of the U.S. approach and allowed Pyongyang to question whether American policy actually reflected the views of the U.S. President.

The Obama administration seems to be considering appointing a senior official, perhaps even a presidential envoy, to coordinate U.S. North Korea policy and oversee the negotiating process.

This would be a wise move, since the envoy would impose discipline on the policy process and signal to U.S. partners in the six-party talks, and to North Korea, that the U.S. approach has the President's personal blessing.

Such a representative could also represent the President to the highest levels of other governments ― including the DPRK ― on this issue (a missing element of the U.S. approach since 2000).

The new U.S. administration may also pursue more comprehensive negotiations with Pyongyang. Such an approach could seek to accelerate the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs and the verifiable elimination of its fissile material and existing weapons in return for a more robust package of incentives.

Backed by a U.S. administration clearly willing and able to deliver on its commitments, such an approach could have the effect of making Pyongyang an offer that it would be foolish to refuse, lest it isolate itself further in the international community.

It might also force Pyongyang to finally make a strategic decision about its relations with the United States and the international community.

Finally, the new American leadership understands that U.S. management of the North Korea issue in recent years has raised concerns among our Korean (and Japanese) allies. It is also aware that the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral consultation and coordination process has frayed.

The Obama administration will work to reinvigorate this consultative process. Importantly, the next American President has made rebuilding America's traditional alliances a central element of his foreign policy agenda, which is very good news for Seoul.

By Evans Revere

The writer is president of the Korea Society in New York City and a former senior U.S. diplomat with 40 years of experience in Asia. The views expressed in this article are his.